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from a judgment of the
Arnold

Action for damages for malicious nT'n>:C•i•HtH\
for defendant after sustaining demurrer to
leave to
affirmed.
Joseph K. Coady for Appellant.
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G.
Bayard Rhone and Norman Sokolow,
eral, for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-In this action for damages for
cious prosecution, plaintiff has appealed from the
entered in favor of defendant following an order
defendant's demurrer without leave to amend.
According to the allegations of the
defendant
maliciously and without probable cause "'"·""''"'" the
tion of two criminal proceedings against
In both
proceedings the charges were based upqn events which allegedly occurred on October 3, 1948. The first
filed in the Municipal Court of the
of
October 5, 1948, charged plaintiff with
violated section
481 of the 1<-,isll and Game Code, in that he had
certain petroleum matter, deleterious to fish and
in the waters of the State of California. On October
that proceeding was dismissed. On
ant, by sworn affidavit, caused a second nr<)CeeCUnQ'
tuted in the United States District Court for
District of California, charging
with
section 407 of 33 U.S.C. (pollution of
July 19, 1949, plaintiff was acquitted in the second
ing.
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in tlw ferlC>ral r:ourt ns r!efelJ(T:ml
11·ithout the 'Wopc nf his
in that conrt W ,, lwve
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Tn support of his first 1:ontt:ntion. plaintiff cites nnr1 rr>li0s
npon C'Prtain
fonnd in Prentice Y
50 Cal.
App.2d 344, :349 1128 P.2d qrn. hnL a~ lwrr>inafter in<1ientf'<l.
we be1ir,.,, that so,mll r•·asnnR of pnbliP
tlm.t a
pew·e offirer. or ,,ther
(\fficial. lw f'rlif'lded
the
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rro:;;N·ntion.
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·~onf:liet brctWf~r·n the publi(·
of
ind1virlna 1
eitizens from
offieiaJ aetion and the
w011
established polie:v of promoting· tlw fearless anrl effpetive :11l·
ministration of the 1aw for tlw whole people
publir· offlerrs from Yindietive a11rt ret:1liatorv
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[1] When tli•· du1
l'l'ill1e and tn mditut
<·timinal
is
i1• offiPfT. it is
for tl!e lwst interests of the
wt!Ole that hP b1•
p1·oteeted from }w !'aSSlll(•Jlt in
of that d 11ty.
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Booth. 56 CaL 65
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fires. was immune; and
an assistant
engi~
and a fire inspector were
their official duties eneompassed
erirnes and the institution of
, in
v. 0
supra,
!)9 B'.2d J
agPnt of the F'ederal Bureau of Investi~
was held to be included within the cloak of immunity.
rrhe court there stated: ''The administration of criminal justice would be
without the active partieipation of
public officials
dt•rmrtments concerned with the
enforcement of
laws . . . lt is the
of all citizens to reYeal such eYidence. of which they may have knowlguilty of misprision of felony for
edge, at the risk of
failing to do so. In the ease of an official, his failure to act
under such circumstances would, in addition, constitute serious ma1feasanee in office•." (99 P.2d 135, 140.)
\Vhile there is
in Prentice v. Bertken, supra, 50
Cal.App.2d
whieh lends support to plaintiff's position,
sueh
is out of
with the majority view which
<'Stablishes the sounder rule, anrl therefore that language must
be disapproved.
'"l'he doetrine of immunity is not for the benefit of the
few who might other\vise bP compelled to answer in damages. It is for the benefit of aU to whom it applies, that they
may be free to aet in the exereise of honest judgment uninfiu.
eneed
fear of consequences personal to themRelves. This
again is not for their personal
or benefit. It is
only that
may be enabled to render a better public ser~
yiee." (Pearson v. Reed, supra. 6 Cal.App.2d 277, 288.)
[3] Although public policy demands that the peaee officer
be free from liability in eivil actions for alleged malicious
prosecution. such policy does not go so far as to free the offending officer from all liability, for it has long been the law in
this state that, ''
very person who maliciously and without
probable cause procur-es a search-warrant or warrant of arrest
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to\Yard the 1:reation of a "
state."
[4] It is also vvPll 0stahlished that a
offieer is liable
for
caused
the scope of his
authority. ( 67 C ..T .S. ~ 1
,..
supra, 1:38 1'~.2d mn ;
supra, 99 F.2d 1
1:37-138.) [5] HO\n'Ycr.
sreonr1 eontention that
rh•f(mdant Towers waR acting outside the scope of his
m
in the federal r'onrt is without merit
The allege(\
tlw State of California whieh were under the c'oncurrent
rlietion of the state and federal
J. II endry
,-~ J!oorc. :JL'i r.S. 10:1
; United
Rtatcs v. Carrillo, lB
v.
14 CaL
2!1 617 [96 P.2(! 9411.1 Defendant Towers was no less dist•ha rging his
laws for the
of
fiRll and g-ame
tlwn lw wonlrl
1nter1 in the Rtate r~om·is. [6] "Duties of
officA include
thosr' lying"·it11in its scope. those essential to arcompliflhment of the mRin purpofles for whi0h the offler was created.
and those whiel1, although only inridental and
flerve
to promote thr
of th <'
purposes."
(Nesbitt F'nt£t Products v. 1YallrtN. 17 F.Supp. 141.
lt would b" an anomalnnR dor·trinP whieh would
pnhlic
nffiePr <J(·t•ess
an~·
eoni'titntrd tribnnR 1 witl1
dir~tion oHr H1e a
that said officer
was a state officer
eeeding in the federal
ing to diseharge hiR duty
in the state eourtR.
A somewhat similar
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189. wJ1erein a
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with the
authorization of the
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1949. is t}Je
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him was filed
filed in April,
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to arrest him while
within the scope
What if the
had alleged that defendant was an "
" ( § 20) of the Fish and Game
Commission and had incorporated defendant's affidavit in
which it was averred that he ~was employed as a janitor in the
offices of the commission 7 Would this court then assume that
on the day the prosecution was commenced,
and
within the scope of his authority so that immunity
from civil liability could be extended to him 1 Probably.
It has been specifically held in this state that deputy fish
and game commissioners are liable in damages for unlawfully
eonfiseating fish, and for torts eommitted in eonneetion with
sueh eonfiseation, even though they acted under a mistaken
bt~licf that the confiscation was proper (Noack v. Zellerbach,
11 Cal.App.2d 186, 188
P.2d 986] [hearing denied] ; Silva
v. J1acAuley, 135 Cal.App. 249 [26 P.2d 887, 27 P.2d 791]
l hearing
) . Assuming for the moment that an investigator is a deputy, if deputies are liable in damages when
are
in
faith, albeit mistakenly, why should
they not be held liable if the aetion is taken with malice? The
Hestatement of Torts ( § 656
) states that only public prosecutors are immune from such liability and that the immunity
does not apply to all persons whose function it is to aid in the
enforcement of the eriminal law. While it may be admitted
that malicious proseeution is a disfavored action, the policy
should not be
further to the extreme of practical nullifieation of the
and the consequent defeat of the other important policy which underlies
of protecting the individual
from the injury eaused
unjustifiable criminal prosecution
18 Cal.2d 146, 159 [114 P.2d 335, 135 A.L.R.
v. Gm·dino, 56 Cal.App.2d 667, 672 [113
; Pnlvermachet· v. Los Angeles Co-ordinating Corn. The plaintiff here should have been permitted
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malicious
action than is defendant in a crimiThe Pish and Game
for ca<~n'p~c
that the attorney for the Division of Fish
and Game shall act as counsel in defense of any officer or
in any suit for damages
such officer
or
to have occurred as the result of the negligenee or misconduct of the officer or deputy while engaged in
the
of his official duties. But a private individual
who has been subjected to malicious and unwarranted criminal
has no such free defense avalaible to him. He
at his own expense, hire his own lawyer and pay his own
costs. I am at a loss to understand how the problematical
"resort to such penal action" (Pen. Code, § 170) provides
"some measure of protection for the individual citizen" and
how it "would subserve the public interest far better than
would a resort to civil litigation against the public officer."
(:Majority opinion.)
The plaintiff contends, and I agree, that the holding in this
ease is a major step toward statism. This case extends the
doe trine of immunity to one who labels himself an "investigator" on the assumption that such an employee is a deputy
commissioner acting within the scope of his authority in bringing such an action. One has only to read the cases cited by the
majority to see how the doctrine has been unnecessarily
stretched and expanded to cover almost any type of employee.
For this court to reach out and extend immunity from civil
liability under the pleadings in this case, is to lay a foundation
for an extension of the privilege that is, to my mind, unthinkable. The protection of individual rights should be zealously
guarded from unwarranted poliee action, and the privilege
of police immunity should be available only to those whose
clear-eut duty it is to apprehend violators of the laws of this
state. The privilege of immunity should not be extended to
those whose duties, power and authority are undefined.
Under the pleadings in the case at hand, plaintiff was entitled to proceed to trial f.or a determination of the questions
of fact presented, and I would ther('fore reverse the judgment
and direct the trial court to overrule the demurrer.
Schauer, J., concurred.
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TION
STANDARD
(la, lb] Labor-Definitions-Laborer.-The me:an:mg of the word
"laborer'' is not fixed in its
and it neeessary in
each situation to look to
eontext in which the term
used to ascertain its ll<v<>.UiJi,.,.
[2] Id.-Definitions-Laborer.-While the >V'Drd "laborer" is comused to
one whose work demands
toil rather than
it is also
work which
a
exertion as
from one who dettenlis
on the exercise of mental faculties to ae<mnlpltsn
and in a more
sense it ineludes
who
with their brains as well as those who
manual work.
[3] Mechanics' Liens-Bonds.-Where a bond exi>re<>SlY states that
it was
for the
of complying
mechanic's
the terms of the
lien law
Civ.
§ 1183 et
its mt:enJreta.statute are to be read into the bond and
tion and effect.
[ 4] !d.-Persons Entitled-Laborers.~In Code
that
materialmen . . . and all 'Pel'SOllS
and laborers of every class
labor
Skill Or Other
Or o11T'nl~:IUYIP' HJC<1>vtCUilii>
power ... shall have a lien upon

